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!What has over the years surfaced as perhaps the central issue in the 
debate surrounding the problem of free will and determinism is the 
question whether determinism is compatible with responsibility. Recently, 
however, some philosophers have shifted this debate—rightly, I think— 
asking not whether determinism and responsibility are compatible, but 
rather whether mechanism and responsibility are compatible.2 
In this essay, I will examine a treatment of the free will/determinism 
problem which assumes this latter, shifted perspective. But before this is 
attempted, some answer must be made to the perfectly understandable 
question, "What does the shift from determinism talk to mechanism talk 
really amount to, and why should we make it?"3 
Determinism, strictly speaking, is a thesis about how events occur, 
amounting to roughly this: Every event is causally necessitated by 
preceding events. If determinism and responsibility are incompatible, it is 
because determinism is an excusing condition, since (1) determinism 
implies that we could not (and cannot) do otherwise than we actually did 
(and do), and (2) we consider not being able to do otherwise an excuse for 
misconduct (and hence, a reason for not holding the agent to be 
responsible). 
Mechanism is a thesis, not about how events occur, but about how 
they are explained, namely: Every event is subject to explanations that do 
not use such telelogical concepts as purposes, intentions, and desires. If 
mechanism and responsibility are incompatible, then it is because 
mechanism forces us to discard certain explanation modes we feel are 
necessary to viewing any agent as responsible. 
*1 am indebted to Ronald McClamrock, Robert Richman, and Ernest Sosa 
for their helpful criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. 
2Those philosophers who have written on the compatibility and/or 
incompatibility of mechanism and responsibility include N. Malcolm, A.I. 
Goldman, D.C. Dennett, A.I. Meldcn, D. Davidson, A. Kenny, A.C. 
Maclntyre, S. Hampshire, M.C. Bradley, L.W. Beck, A. Flew, W. Sellars, 
P.F. Strawson, D.M. MacKay, C. Taylor, and D. Hofstadter. 
3In answering this complex question below I draw heavily from sections 3 
and 7 in Gary Watson's excellent Introduction to Gary Watson (cd). Free 
Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
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Modal incompatibilism (i.e., the thesis that determinism (with its 
"necessity") and responsibility are incompatible) is explained by Gary 
Watson in this way: 
Determinism is said to imply that certain criteria internal to our moral 
framework are never satisfied, for example, that we are all excused for 
our misconduct because not being able to do otherwise is an excuse. 
(Watson, p. 13) 
However, determinism talk always appears incongruous with, and remote 
from, the way we talk about moral matters, and hence we often have the 
intuition that determinism somehow cannot address our moral framework, 
much less invalidate one of its criteria. 
Explanatory incompatibilism (i.e., the thesis that mechanism and 
responsibility are incompatible) vindicates our intuition: 
(I)t is not that determinism4 implies the omnipresence of the usual 
excusing conditions, but that it calls into question the whole 
framework in which talk of exculpation makes sense. Our conduct 
would then have the status of natural forces. The reason these are not 
morally responsible agents is not that they couldn't have done 
otherwise; it is that they arc not telcological agents. (Watson, p. 13) 
Mechanism, then, does not attempt to address our moral framework; it 
supersedes it. 
The shift from determinism talk to mechanism talk is not simply a 
change in the way we view some truth about the world. Whereas it is true 
that determinism implies mechanism and its explanatory restrictions, it is 
not true that mechanism implies determinism. 
A fruitful and comprehensive explanatory scheme that was both 
mechanistic and inherently probabilistic would tend just as much (or 
little) to displace teleological accounts. (Watson, p. 13) 
Against this background I can now enter into the project of this essay, 
which is to examine an important article by Daniel C. Dennett on 
explanatory incompatibilism, appropriately titled "Mechanism and 
4Watson waits until the end of his discussion on explanatory 
incompatibilism to make a clear break between determinism and 
mechanism (see Watson, p. 13); before that he treats mechanism as 
another way to think about determinism, and thus has explanatory 
incompatibilists and modal incompatibilists alike talking about 
determinism and what it implies. This is one such instance. Little violence 
would be done to the text if "mechanism" were inserted here for 
"determinism", since this is really what Watson has in mind. 
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1. 
Dennett starts out the first section of "Mechanism and Responsibility" 
by telling us that "mechanism is here to stay, unlike determinism and its 
denial, which go in and out of fashion." (Dennett, p. 150) However, this 
permanence of mechanism, brought on by its success in describing people 
and other things, is supposedly disturbing, since 
...whenever a particular bit of human motion can be given an entirely 
mechanistic explanation...any non-mechanistic, rational purposive 
explanation of the same motions is otiose. (Dennett, p. 150) 
Indeed, it seems that purposive explanations are not only rendered otiose, 
but are false, a claim Dennett describes as the principle that "the 
mechanistic displaces the purposive" (hereafter, the "displacement 
principle"), and which he states like this: 
...any mechanistic (or causal) explanation of human motions takes 
priority over, indeed renders false, any explanation in terms of desires, 
beliefs, intention. (Dennett, p. 151) 
Since this is supposed to be a problem for the believer in 
responsibility, according to Dennett, it is implied that responsibility 
somehow requires the purposive kind of explanation which is rendered 
false. The argument which arises out of this proceeds from the claims that 
(1) there exist mechanistic explanations of human motion, (2) mechanistic 
explanations render rational, purposive explanations false, and (3) 
responsibility presupposes such rational, purposive explanations, to the 
conclusion (4) there is no responsibility. Dennett wishes to deny this 
conclusion, and since the inference appears to be valid, he denies one of 
the premissed claims, that being that mechanistic explanations falsify 
purposive ones. 
In order to show the displacement principle to be faulty, Dennett 
realizes that he needs to get clear on the elements of this principle, 
something he does in sections II, III, and IV. I discuss two of Dennett's 
elaborations here. 
5Danicl C. Dennett, "Mechanism and Responsibility," in Watson, pp. 150-
73. 
Responsibility." 5 The two goals of my examination are (1) the brief 
formulation of Dennett's compatibilist project, and (2) the criticism and 
replacement of one of Dennett's major arguments. My work towards 
these two goals will correspond respectively to the two parts of this paper. 
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1. The displacement principle has to do with two types of explanation, 
one mechanistic and the other purposive. Within the latter, which 
Dennett prefers to term 'Intentional,' arises our notion of responsibility, 
and for good reason: 
Intentional explanations..x\\c thoughts, desires, beliefs, intentions, 
rather than chemical reactions, explosions, electric impulses, in 
explaining the occurrence of human motions. (Dennett, p. 152) 
More to the point, though, the crucial difference between these 
explanation kinds for Dennett is that the Intentional explanation gives a 
rationale for the explicandum, and the mechanistic explanation does not. 
The latter is to be considered just a causal story, whereas the former is 
more.6 
2. Intentional explanations are given from the Intentional stance, 
which carries with it an assumption of rationality for the entity whose 
behaviour is explained.7 However, this stance, which involves talk of 
responsibility, does not necessarily involve moral responsibility; that is the 
province of the moral (or personal) stance. The moral stance, though, does 
presuppose the Intentional stance, and the importance of this fact is 
emphasized by Dennett in concluding section IV: 
The ethical implication to be extracted from the distinction of stance 
is not that the Intentional stance is a moral stance, but that it is a 
precondition of any moral stance, and hence if it is jeopardized by any 
triumph of mechanism, the notion of moral responsibility is 
jeopardized in turn. (Dennett, p. 160) 
We can now reformulate Dennett's project in virtue of these 
elaborations. This is the complete argument which Dennett needs to 
defeat: 
1. Human motion is explainable from the mechanistic stance. 
2 The mechanistic stance precludes the Intentional stance. 
3. The moral stance presupposes the Intentional stance. 
4 Moral responsibility assumes explanation from the moral 
stance. 
As Dennett writes, he is interested in establishing "that Intentional 
explanations are at least not causal explanations simpliciter." (Dennett, 
"Mechanism," p. 152) This entire paragraph 1. is an elaboration on 
Dennett's section II. 
7Find a rich exposition of the Intentional and other stances in Dennett's 
section III. The balance of this paragraph deals with material in section 
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8There are seven sections in Dennett, "Mechanism." Here I do not 
explicitly deal with sections VI and VII. 
9 A C. Maclntyre, "Determinism," in Bernard Berofsky (ed), Free Will and 
Determinism (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 240-56. 
Thus 5. Moral responsibility is in principle discardable. 
Dennett wishes here to deny premiss 2., once again claiming that the 
mechanistic and Intentional stances are compatible. 
This affords a general view of Dennett's project in terms of its 
objective and its context. However, a fuller picture is possible by making 
one contrast between Dennett and others who talk about responsibility. 
Dennett talks about human motions being explainable from different 
stances, but many others consider human actions as the proper locus of 
reference in determining responsibility. The motivation for Dennett's 
policy appears to be this: by using a neutral term for those things which 
are describablc as actions or as "mere" events, one does not prejudice 
either the Intentional or mechanistic stance. To those who use the term 
"action" in developing arguments either for or against human 
responsibility, Dennett may well claim that such use carries with it a 
presupposition of the Intentional stance, where by definition talk about 
reasons, desires, and intentions will apply, and talk solely about causes 
won't 
2 
Sections I though IV in "Mechanism and. Responsibility" present 
Dennett's compatibilist project, something I have briefly formulated in 
part 1. Here I wish to analyze Dennett's attempt in section V to fulfill part 
of that project; 8 an attempt, specifically, to rebut an argument by A.C. 
Maclntyre for the incompatibility of the mechanistic and Intentional 
stances. My general scheme here will be to (1) present the very words of 
Maclntyre which Dennett cites and draws upon, (2) explain and critique 
Dennett's formulation of, and response, to, Maclntyre, (3) reinterpret 
Maclntyre's argument, and finally (4) present a criticism to Maclntyre 
which Dennett should employ in light of the reinterpretation. 
Dennett begins his consideration of Maclntyre by quoting a few 
passages from one section of Maclntyre's article, "Determinism."9 The 
cited passages are as follows: 
Behaviour is rational—in this arbitrarily, defined sense—if, and only if, 
it can be influenced, or inhibited by the adducing of some logically 
relevant consideration....But this means that if a man's behaviour is 
rational it cannot be determined by the state of glands or any other 
antecedent causal factor. For if giving a man more or better 
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information or suggesting a new argument to him is a both necessary 
and sufficient condition for, as we say, changing his mind, then we 
exclude, for this occasion at least, the possibility of other sufficient 
conditions—Thus to show that behaviour is rational is enough to show 
that it is not causally determined in the sense of being the effect of a 
set of sufficient conditions operating independently of the agent's 
deliberation or possibility of deliberation. So the discoveries of the 
physiologist and psychologist may indefinitely increase our 
knowledge of why men behave irrationally but they could never show 
that rational behaviour in this sense was causally determined.1 0 
Dennett believes the most fundamental point to come out of what 
Maclntyre says above is the "misleading suggestion" that 
...the existence of sufficient conditions for events in a system puts that 
system in a strait-jacket, as it were, and thus denies it the flexibility 
required of a truly rational system. (Dennett, p. 161) 
Dennett takes this to imply the incompatibility of the mechanistic and 
Intentional stances, presumably via reasoning something like this: 
Rationality, for Maclntyre, entails a lack of, and thus independence from, 
sufficient (causal) conditions, meaning that if such conditions do exist (i.e., 
if mechanistic explanation is in principle applicable) then the system 
under scrutiny is somehow "programmed," and thus non-rational (hence, a 
presupposition of Intentional explanation is false). How Dennett actually 
formulates Maclntyre's argument for the latter's 'suggestion' and the 
incompatibilism it implies, plus how Dennett in turn responds to this 
argument, is what must now be investigated. 
Dennett outlines the Maclntyre argument as one based on the idea of 
tropistic behaviour; behaviour, in other words, done solely in response to, 
or under the direct control of, a stimulus. To illustrate the concept, 
Dennett uses an example from Dean Wooldridge1 1 of an egg-carrying 
wasp which, being first thought to act in a rational manner when preparing 
to lay her eggs, is later discovered to be acting from a very simple routine 
of stimuli, and thus isn't considered rational. For example, the wasp always 
leaves a cricket which it has paralyzed (which is to be food for the newly 
hatched wasp grubs) on the threshold of the burrow to be used for 
hatching, goes inside to inspect the hole, and then comes out to drag the 
cricket inside. 
10MacIntyre, pp. 248-9. The quotation in this form is taken from Dennett, 
"Mechanism," p. 161. 
"Dean Wooldridge, The Machinery of the Brain (New York: McCraw 
Hill, 1963). 
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, 2Wooldridge, p. 82. This passage is cited in Dennett, "Mechanism," p. 
162. 
1 3Thcse concerns, according to D. Dennett, Elbow Room (Cambridge and 
London: The MIT Press, 1984), give life to one of the unwarranted 
"bugbears" of the free will problem: the fear of sphexishness. (Dennett is 
using a term from Douglas Hofstadter, "On the Seeming paradox of 
Mechanizing Creativity," in D. Hofstadter, Melamagical Themas (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985), pp. 526-46, the root of which comes from the 
genus (Sphex) of the digger wasp we encountered above.) The fear is that 
we may be like the wasp in the respect that "she is not a free agent, but 
rather at the mercy of brute physical causation, driven inexorably into her 
states and activities by features of the environment outside her control." 
(Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 11) Compare this with Hofstadter, "Paradox," pp. 
529-538. 
1 4Dennctt, "Mechanism," p. 163. I see this as a variation of another claim, 
made by Dennett as he lays out his version of Maclntyre's argument: 
. . .there is no way to design a system that can be guaranteed to react 
appropriately under all environmental conditions. (Dennett, 
"Mechanism," p. 162) 
Dennett argues for this claim in D. Dennett, Content and Consciousness 
(London and Henley: Routledgc & Kcgan Paul, 1969). 
The underlying idea here is brought out nicely in Dennett, Elbow 
Room: 
If, while the wasp is inside making her preliminary inspection the 
cricket is moved a few inches away, the wasp, on emerging from the 
burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not inside, and 
will then repeat the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow to 
see that everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed a few 
inches while the wasp is inside, once again the wasp will move the 
cricket up to the threshold and re-enter the borrow for a final check. 
The wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight in. 1 2 
The wasp's behaviour is a tropism because the mechanism which governs 
it is finite—i.e., at some degree of complexity there are relevant distinctions 
to be made but these fall outside of the mechanism's scope, and thus go 
unheeded. The extrapolation we are to make from this is that we are, in 
principle, no different from the wasp. We may be incredibly more 
complex, but our behaviour, being controlled by a finite mechanism, is 
tropistic.13 
Dennett sees Maclntyre correctly contending that "any system that 
can be explained mechanistically-at whatever length—must be in an 
extended sense tropistic."1 4 (The tropism interpretation appears to arise 
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from the straitjackct/flexibility metaphor which Dennett uses in 
characterizing Maclntyre's 'misleading suggestion'. See passage quoted 
above.) But what does this all-pervasive tropism mean except that any 
mechanistic system (presumably including the human one) fails to react 
to some 'logically relevant considerations'? Indeed, just as the wasp 
doesn't take note of having checked the burrow before, but repeats the 
procedure of bringing the cricket to the threshold and then entering to 
check the burrow again, so we must not take note of everything relevant.15 
At this point, Dennett would have Maclntyre bring in his definition of 
rationality-that being, roughly, the capacity to be affected by some 
logically relevant consideration-and thus conclude that if we are like the 
wasp we are indeed not rational. (Notice, however, that this move requires 
Dennett to interpret Maclntyre's "rationality" as "the capacity to be 
affected by any logically relevant consideration.") But if we are not rational 
(by virtue of mechanism, via our tropistic nature), then for Dennett this 
amounts to a denial of the applicability of the Intentional stance, and thus 
we can conclude that the mechanistic stance precludes the Intentional 
stance. 
Dennett's version of Maclntyre's argument runs then like this: 
.brains are meaning manipulators, information 
processors,...semantic engines, (p. 28) 
...as physical mechanisms |brains| can only be syntactic engines, 
responding only to structural or formal properties, (p. 28) 
Since meaning does not reside, like some rare ore, in physical features 
of stimuli, no alchemical extraction process could distill it and 
respond to it. (p. 28) 
...brains only approximate the behavior of the (ideal, pure) semantic 
engine. The perfect semantic engine, the perfect Kantian rational 
will, is indeed friction-free, infinitely alert to nuances of meaning, 
perfectly invulnerable to sphexishness—and physically impossible, (p. 
See also Dennett's comments on how "the proof in computability 
theory that the 'halting problem' has no solution" shows that there could 
be no finite, nonmagical, perfect self-watcher. (Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 
31) 
1 5Notice that I cannot be much more specific than this, since a list of the 
things which arc known (a) to exist and (b) to be totally outside of our ken, 
would smack of self-contradiction. 
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1 6 The thesis is implied by this passage: 
...the only implication that could be drawn from the general thesis of 
man's ultimately mechanistic organization would be that man must, 
then, be imperfectly rational, in the sense that he cannot be so 
designed as to ensure rational responses to all contingencies, hardly 
an alarming or counter intuitive finding...(Dennett, "Mechanism," pp. 
163-164) 
1. Any system capable of being explained from the mechanistic 
stance is tropistic. 
2. If a system is tropistic, then there are logically relevant 
considerations by which it is not affected. 
3. If there are logically relevant considerations by which a system 
is not affected, then that system is not rational. 
4. If a system is not rational, then the Intentional stance is not 
applicable. 
Thus 5. Any system capable of being explained from the mechanistic 
stance is not explainable from the Intentional stance. 
Dennett must reject the conclusion in line 5., and since the argument 
appears to be valid, he is committed to denying at least one of the 
premisses leading to that conclusion. I believe Dennett denies premiss 3., 
since he sees it implying a maximally restrictive notion of rationality, 
disagreeable since it follows from it, he believes, that no one (indeed, no 
thing) is rational. 
Rationality, for Dennett, admits of degrees; it makes sense to say one 
person (or one thing) is more rational than another. 1 6 Maclntyre, through 
premiss 3., characterizes rationality as an ideal to be approached but never 
attained. This contrast is brought out in an important passage in which 
Dennett explains why the fact that human beings are finitely mechanistic 
systems and thus tropistic does not mean that we are not rational or 
Intentionally explainable: 
...although in the case of the wasp we can say that its behaviour has 
been shown to be merely mechanically controlled, what force would 
the 'merely' have if we were to entertain the notion that the control of 
man's more versatile behaviour is merely mechanical? The 
denigration might well be appropriate if in a particular case the 
mechanical explanation of a bit of behaviour was short and 
sweet....but we must also consider cases in which the physiologist or 
cybernetician hands us twenty volumes of fine print and says, 'Here is 
the design of this man's behavioural control system*. Here is a case 
where the philosopher's preference for simple examples leads him 
astray, for of course any simple mechanistic explanation of a bit of 
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behaviour will disqualify it for plausible Intentional characterization, 
make it a mere happening and not an action, but we cannot 
generalize from simple examples to complex, for it is precisely the 
simplicity of the examples that grounds the crucial conclusion. 
(Dennett, p. 163) 
Dennett is saying that although Maclntyre is right to infer our tropistic 
nature from the facts that (a) the wasp is tropistic and (b) we are like the 
wasp in being mechanistically explainable, he is not right in making his 
further inference. Even though we are like the wasp in our tropism, it does 
not follow that we are alike in rationality or susceptibility to Intentional 
explanation. The reason is this: rationality is not a function of whether we 
heed all logically relevant considerations or whether we are 
mechanistically explainable, but a function of how many considerations we 
heed and how complex our mechanism. The predictive power, and thus 
the applicability, of the Intentional stance (with its assumption of 
rationality) is brought out as the tropistic nature of systems is made more 
and more complex.1 7 
So, it is not the case that any system which is not affected by some 
logically relevant consideration is not rational, but that it is imperfectly 
rational in inverse proportion to the complexity of the system's 
mechanism. This is what I think to be a plausible reading of Dennett's 
response to Maclntyre. 
Dennett's reply to the argument he has characterized as Maclntyre's 
seems correct. However, I am not convinced that the argument which is 
responded to is in fact Maclntyre's. Below, I shall present three reasons 
for doubting Dennett's interpretation, after which I will reinterpret 
Maclntyre's argument and look for a response to it which Dennett could 
use. 
First, it is unclear that Dennett has correctly interpreted Maclntyre's 
definition of rationality as (roughly) "the capacity to be affected by some 
(i.e., any) logically relevant consideration." Another reading, which seems 
to be the prima facie obvious one, renders rationality as "the capacity to be 
affected by some (i.e., at least one) logically relevant consideration." 
Under this interpretation, many systems are classified as rational, with 
distinctions made within the class based upon how many considerations 
are heeded. Notice two things about this reading: (1) it would rule out 
premiss 3. in the Dennett rendition of Maclntyre's argument, making 
1 7What Dennett has in mind in the passage quoted immediately above is 
elaborated on in Dennett, Elbow Room. There the author uses the notion 
of an intuition pump (roughly, a thought experiment which emphasizes the 
"important" features of the case at hand to arrive at a particular intuition) 
which ignores complexity to explain the erroneous inference from 
sphcxishness to non-rationality. (See Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 12, 31-34) 
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1 8 In Maclntyre, there is nearly a page-long gap between the first and 
second passages. (See Maclntyre, pp. 248-9) However, 1 believe Dennett's 
"compression" of Maclntyre' words preserves the inferential connection 
which Maclntyre creates between the passages. 
Dennett's version untenable and his response to it superfluous, and (2) it 
highly resembles Dennett's own idea of rationality. 
Second, is it plain that Maclntyre's argument can be accurately 
captured within Dennett's model of tropistic behaviour? Dennett points 
toward tropism talk by using his strait-jacket/flexibility metaphor to 
characterize Maclntyre's 'misleading suggestion'. But Maclntyre never 
talks about tropism, strait-jackets, or the like, and so without further 
elaboration from Dennett we are justified in being a little skeptical. 
Third, Dennett's interpretation of the argument ignores Maclntyre's 
flow of reasoning. Dennett wants to show Maclntyre as starting with a 
connection between mechanism and tropism, then adding his definition of 
rationality, and finally concluding with incompatibilism. However, as the 
cited passages shows, Maclntyre starts with his definition of rationality; the 
second passage (beginning 'But this means that ...') follows from the 
definition in some way, and the third passage (beginning Thus...") follows 
from the second. 1 8 
Given the above considerations, an alternative to Dennett's 
interpretation of the Maclntyre argument should at least be entertained. 
The interpretation I will develop here is more literal than Dennett's, and as 
a result avoids the last two potential difficulties just outlined. The 
interpretation also ignores any dispute over the proper rendering of 
Maclntyre's definition of rationality, and thus avoids the first objection as 
well. 
The Maclntyre quotation cited by Dennett contains three distinct but 
interconnected passages. The first page gives us the definition of rational 
behaviour as behaviour which "can be influenced, or inhibited by the 
adducing of some logically relevant consideration." Thus, this capacity to 
be affected by the right things lies at the heart of the idea of rationality. 
The third passage represents the conclusion with which Dennett takes 
issue. The key segment is this: 
...to show that behaviour is rational is enough to show that it is not 
causally determined... 
Thus, rationality (along with Intentional explanation) precludes causal (i.e., 
mechanistically explainable) determination, and vice-versa. 
Now something has happened between the first passage, which gives 
us a definition of rationality, and this third passage about the 
incompatibility of rationality and causal determination. In the second 
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passage, we are supposedly to find a justificatory bridge from one to the 
other. The key segment here is as follows: 
...if a man's behaviour is rational it cannot be determined by the state 
of his glands or any other antecedent causal factor. 
This statement can be read in at least two different ways, and my claim is 
that Maclntyre exploits this ambiguity in requiring the second passage to 
both follow from the first and also imply the third. 1 will try to make this 
apparent in giving the general points of the argument. 
1. Rational behaviour is defined as behaviour which can be affected 
by some logically relevant consideration. 
2. But if 1. is the case, then rational behaviour is not determined by 
something elsc-e.g., any causal factor. 
3. However, from 2, we can infer that if we have some behaviour which 
is rational, then we know that it is not causally determined. 
Each line—1., 2., and 3.—represents what I've remarked to be the general 
point of the first, second, and third passages, respectively. In reading 
through the steps, one should focus on what service line 2. is giving at the 
two stages of the argument with which it is concerned. 
From line 1. to line 2. we get something like an inference concerning 
the logical properties of rational behaviour: from a definition, and thus a 
statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions, of rational behaviour, 
we can infer that any specification distinct from that set of conditions is not 
the definition of rational behaviour. This point can be expressed using 
Maclntyre's term 'determine': whether or not a given behaviour is rational 
is determined by whether it can be affected by some logically relevant 
consideration; but if this is how rational behaviour is (logically) 
determined, then anything distinct from it (e.g., 'any brute causal factor') 
will not (logically) determine rational behaviour. Hence, line 2. concerns 
logical determination. 
From line 2. to line 3. we are again to infer something concerning 
determination, but now it is causal determination. Line 3. denies causal 
determination to a behaviour which is rational, and thus line 2., if it is to 
lead to 3. in some direct manner, must be read as also saying something 
about causal determination. 
What this analysis points to is the necessity for Maclntyre to 
equivocate on the term "determine" in order for the conclusion 3. to follow 
from 1. Hence, the inference is invalid. To further illustrate the mistake I 
see Maclntyre making here, I present an analogous argument. 
1. Good dice-rolls (of two dice, say) are determined by whether the 
dice score over seven points or not. 
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1 9 M. C. Bradley, "A Note on Mr. Maclntyre's 'Determinism'," in Berofsky, 
p. 257. 
*°Dennett talks of reasons and causes in connection with 
mechanism/responsibility incompatibilism in Dennett, Elbow Room. 
There he seems to hold that theses claiming that reasons and causes are 
incompatible arc usually the output of an intuition pump erroneously 
focused on very simple causal stories, (pp. 31-32) This parallels what we've 
seen to be Dennett's diagnosis of Maclntyre. 
2. But if 1. is the case, then good dice-rolls arc not determined by 
something elsc-c.g. by random. 
3. However, from 2, we can infer that if we have some dice-roll which is 
good, then we know that the roll is not determined by random. 
The same equivocation is going on here as before: the first inference (1. to 
2.) concerns the logical determination of good dice-rolls (i.e., what we mean 
and do not mean by 'good dice-roll'), whereas the second inference (2. to 
3.) concerns the causal determination of good dice-rolls. 
Another way of characterizing this objection springs from M. C. 
Bradley's response to this same argument of Maclntyre.1 9 Bradley says 
that Maclntyre wants to infer from a fact about the reasons why we act to a 
fact about the causes of our actions-specifically, the inference is this: if 
rational behaviour is (logically) determined by my reasons for action, then 
it is not (logically) determined by anything else (e.g., any brute causal 
factor); but then since the behaviour is not determined by any causal 
factor it isn't causally determined. This type of inference can be made in 
my interpretation of the argument only if line 2. is made to emphasize first 
the reasons of "rational behaviour," and then the causes, and this is 
another aspect of the same equivocation mentioned above. 2 0 
The equivocation objection seems to be the proper response to 
Maclntyre's argument as I have interpreted it. If Dennett replaces his 
potentially problematic version of the argument with mine, then he should 
employ the equivocation criticism. 
We can now recapitulate the major steps of this essay: First, Dennett 
argues for the existence of moral responsibility in light of mechanism 
through denying a premiss in an argument meant to show the contrary; 
Second, the premiss he denies claims that mechanistic and Intentional 
explanation stances are incompatible; Third, an argument for the denied 
premiss which Dennett considers is given by Maclntyre; Fourth, Dennett 
characterizes the Maclntyre argument as one based on the fact of 
humans' tropistic nature, and he attacks the conclusion by claiming that 
"rationality" is a term which admits of degrees; Fifth, there is reason to 
believe Dennett's characterization of Maclntyre's argument is incorrect, 
and that the argument is properly understood in the way I outline it above; 
Sixth, the alternative characterization of Maclntyre's argument leads one 
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to believe that Maclntyre is really trading on an ambiguity in order to 
reach his desired conclusion; and Seventh, it is this equivocation which 
Dennett should emphasize in responding to Maclntyre's argument, and 
thus better support the central claim of his article. 
